Gretschko, Vitali und Helene Mass (forthcoming), Worst-Case Equilibria in First-Price Auctions, Theoretical Economics.

Fugger, Nicolas, Vitali Gretschko und Martin Pollrich (2022), Information design in sequential procurement, Games and Economic Behavior 135, 79-85.

Riehm, Tobias, Nicolas Fugger, Philippe Gillen, Vitali Gretschko und Peter Werner (2022), Social Norms, Sanctions, and Conditional Entry in Markets with Externalities: Evidence from an Artefactual Field Experiment, Journal of Public Economics 212.

Gretschko, Vitali und Martin Pollrich (2021), Incomplete Contracts in Multi-Period Procurement, Management Science.

Mass, Helene, Achim Wambach, Nicolas Fugger und Vitali Gretschko (2020), Imitation Perfection—A Simple Rule to Prevent Discrimination in Procurement, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 12(3), 189-245.

Gretschko, Vitali (2018), A Procurement Mechanism to Assign Refugee Quotas, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 175(1).

Bichler, Martin, Vitali Gretschko und Maarten Janssen (2017), Bargaining in spectrum auctions: A review of the German 2015 LTE auction, Telecommunications Policy.

Gillen, Philippe, Vitali Gretschko und Alexander Rasch (2016), Pre-auction or post-auction qualification?, Economic Theory Bulletin.

Gretschko, Vitali und Achim Wambach (2016), Procurement under public scrutiny: Auctions vs. negotiations, RAND Journal of Economics 47, 914-934.

Gretschko, Vitali und Alexander Rajko (2015), Excess information acquisition in auctions, Experimental Economics 18, 335-355.

Gretschko, Vitali, Alexander Rasch und Achim Wambach (2014), On the strictly descending multi-unit auction, Journal of Mathematical Economics 50, 79-85.

Gretschko, Vitali und Achim Wambach (2014), Information acquisition during a descending auction, Economic Theory 55, 731-751.

Wambach, Achim, Vitali Gretschko und Thilo Klein (2019), Die Regeln machen den Unterschied: Marktdesign, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium 48, Bd. 4 , 22-28.

Gretschko, Vitali (2016), Was gutes Marktdesign leisten kann, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung .

Gretschko, Vitali, Nicolas Fugger und Philippe Gillen (2016), Beschaffungskonflikte: Volkswagen und seine Zulieferer, Wirtschaftsdienst – Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik 96. Jahrgang,Heft 9 , 626-627.

Ashour Novirdoust, Amir, Rajon Bhuiyan, Martin Bichler, Hans Ulrich Buhl, Gilbert Fridgen, Carina Fugger, Vitali Gretschko, Lisa Hanny, Johannes Knörr, Karsten Neuhoff, Christoph Neumann und Marion Ott (2021), Electricity Market Design 2030-2050: Moving Towards Implementation, Fraunhofer Publica , Sankt Augustin.

Gretschko, Vitali, Martin Bichler, Hans Ulrich Buhl, Lisa Hanny, Marion Ott, Amir Ashour Novirdoust, Caroline Bojung, Gilbert Fridgen, Johannes Knörr, Felipe Maldonado, Karsten Neuhoff, Christoph Neumann, Jörn C. Richstein, Maximilian Rinck, Michael Schöpf, Paul Schott, Amelie Sitzmann, Johannes Wagner, Jonathan Wagner und Martin Weibelzahl (2021), Electricity Spot Market Design 2030-2050, Fraunhofer Publica , Sankt Augustin.

Gretschko, Vitali, Stephan Knapek und Achim Wambach (2017), Bidding Complexities in Combinatorial Clock Auctions, in: Martin Bichler, Jacob Gorree Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design, Cambridge University Press

Gretschko, Vitali und Achim Wambach (2021), Stellungnahme zu Grundsätzen und Szenarien für die Bereitstellung der Mobilfunkfrequenzen, Stellungnahme des ZEW Mannheim im Rahmen der öffentlichen Konsultation der Bundesnetzagentur, ZEW-Kurzexpertise Nr. 21-07, Mannheim

Gretschko, Vitali und Marion Ott (2021), Ein flexibles Vergütungskonzept für Mediziner hilft, Herdenimmunität gegen COVID-19 zu erreichen, ZEW policy brief Nr. 21-03, Mannheim

Riehm, Tobias, Nicolas Fugger, Philippe Gillen, Vitali Gretschko und Peter Werner (2021), Social Norms and Market Behavior – Evidence From a Large Population Sample, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 21-017, Mannheim

Gretschko, Vitali und Martin Pollrich (2019), Incomplete Contracts in Dynamic Procurement, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 19-040, Mannheim

Fugger, Nicolas, Vitali Gretschko und Martin Pollrich (2019), Sequential Procurement with Limited Commitment, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 19-030, Mannheim

Gretschko, Vitali und Helene Mass (2018), Endogenous Worst-Case Beliefs in First-Price Auctions, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 18-056, Mannheim

Gretschko, Vitali und Achim Wambach (2018), Contract Design with Limited Commitment, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 18-054, Mannheim

Gretschko, Vitali und Helene Mass (2018), Endogenous Worst-Case Beliefs in First-Price Auctions,

Gretschko, Vitali und Achim Wambach (2017), Contract (Re-)Negotiation with Private and Common Values, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 17-056, Mannheim

Mass, Helene, Nicolas Fugger, Vitali Gretschko und Achim Wambach (2017), Imitation Perfection – A Simple Rule to Prevent Discrimination in Procurement, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 17-058, Mannheim

Gretschko, Vitali, Stephan Knapek und Achim Wambach (2013), Spectrum Aggregation Limits in Auctions with Spectrum below 1 GHz: the European Experience, FCC, Munich

10.2018 – 02.2019 Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, Deutschland

03. – 05.2016 Freie Universität Berlin (FUB), Deutschland

09.2011 – 05.2012 Yale University, New Haven, Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika (USA)

Prof. Dr. Vitali Gretschko, Cologne Workshop in Auction and Procurement Design, Cologne, Deutschland, 2015

Prof. Dr. Vitali Gretschko, Cologne Workshop on Procurement Design, Cologne, Deutschland, 2014