Publikationen des Forschungsbereichs Marktdesign

  1. Referierte Fachzeitschrift // forthcoming

    First Best Implementation With Costly Information Acquisition

    We study mechanism design with flexible but costly information acquisition. There is a principal and four or more agents, sharing a common prior over a set of payoff-
    relevant states. The principal proposes a…

  2. ZEW Discussion Paper Nr. 25-023 // 2025

    Sorting, Status, and Shadow Education: How Track Placement Shapes Parental Investment

    Educational tracking—separating students into tracks or schools by ability — is commonplace, but access and preferences for top programs often depend on socioeconomic status (SES), reinforcing inequality. We…

  3. ZEW Discussion Paper Nr. 25-009 // 2025

    Bidding for Subsidies With One’s Patience

    We study the problem of distributing subsidies in a market that includes both marginal individuals in need of assistance and infra-marginal individuals who would purchase the subsidized product without…

  4. ZEW Discussion Paper Nr. 24-084 // 2024

    Information Design With Frame Choice

    We study how framing interplays with information design. Whereas Sender conceives all contingencies separately, Receiver cannot initially distinguish among some of them, i.e., has a coarse frame. To influence…