Publikationen des Forschungsbereichs Marktdesign

  1. Referierte Fachzeitschrift // forthcoming

    Worst-Case Equilibria in First-Price Auctions

  2. ZEW Discussion Paper Nr. 22-064 // 2022

    First Best Implementation With Costly Information Acquisition

    We study mechanism design with flexible but costly information acquisition. There is a principal and four or more agents, sharing a common prior over the set of payoff-relevant states. The principal proposes a…

  3. #ZEWPodcast // 2022

    Dr. Marion Ott: Welches Marktdesign braucht die Energiewende?

    Die Energiewende steht ganz oben auf der politischen Agenda. Stand jetzt ist es aber mehr als ungewiss, ob die Politik auch ihre ambitionierten Ausbauziele erreicht. Auf der Angebotsseite, aber auch beim…

  4. ZEW Discussion Paper Nr. 22-062 // 2022

    Motivated Beliefs in Auctions

    In auctions bidders are usually assumed to have rational expectations with regards to their winning probability. However, experimental and empirical evidence suggests that agent's expectations depend on direct…

  5. ZEW Discussion Paper Nr. 22-060 // 2022

    Congestion Management Games in Electricity Markets

    This paper proposes a game-theoretic model to analyze the strategic behavior of inc-dec gaming in market-based congestion management (redispatch). We extend existing models by considering incomplete information…

  6. ZEW Discussion Paper Nr. 22-056 // 2022

    The Value of Decentralization Using the Blockchain

    Although blockchain technology and cryptocurrencies have grown in popularity over the past years, there does not seem to be a consensus if they bring any value to economic interactions. In this paper, I argue…