Publikationen des Forschungsbereichs Marktdesign

  1. ZEW Discussion Paper Nr. 25-048 // 2025

    Visibly Fair Mechanisms

    Priority-based allocation often requires eliminating justified envy, making serial dictatorship (SD) the only non-wasteful direct mechanism with that property. However, SD’s outcomes can conflict with the…

  2. ZEW Discussion Paper Nr. 25-038 // 2025

    Profit-Share Auctions in Procurement

    We investigate profit-share auctions in a procurement context,comparing them with traditional cash auctions to identify which mechanism yields lower expenses for buyers. We also explore whether specifying a high…

  3. ZEW Discussion Paper Nr. 25-044 // 2025

    Congestion Management Games in Electricity Markets

    This paper proposes a game-theoretic model to analyze the strategic behavior of incdec gaming in market-based congestion management (redispatch). We extend existing models by considering incomplete information…

  4. ZEW Discussion Paper Nr. 25-039 // 2025

    Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Role of Communication in an Experiment With Procurement Managers

    We investigate how buyer-supplier communication affects procurement prices, comparing auctions without direct communication to negotiations allowing it. In controlled experiments involving students and…