Publications of the Research Unit Market Design

  1. Refereed Journal // forthcoming

    Asylum Assignment and Burden-Sharing

    We analyze the problem of matching asylum seekers to member states, incorporating wait times, preferences of asylum seekers, and the priorities, capacities, and burden-sharing commitments of member states. We…

  2. Refereed Journal // 2026

    Booster draft mechanisms for multi-object assignment

    We describe a new class of mechanisms—referred to as booster draft mechanisms—for allocating indivisible objects among n individuals with responsive preferences. Specifically, n individuals are assigned m

  3. Refereed Journal // 2026

    Congestion Management Games in Electricity Markets

    This paper proposes a game-theoretic model to analyze the strategic behavior of inc-dec gaming in market-based congestion management (redispatch). We extend existing models by considering incomplete information…

  4. ZEW policy brief No. 25-10 // 2025

    Rethinking Tracking: Lessons from Hungary for German Education Reform

    Educational tracking – separating students into different classes, tracks, or schools based on ability – is relatively commonplace worldwide, despite mixed evidence concerning how it affects student outcomes.…

  5. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 25-072 // 2025

    When Money Shouldn’t Buy

    Banning money in markets for goods like education or health is a common policy to prevent unfair access by the wealthy. We investigate whether this policy is well-targeted for its intended goal. For this, we…

  6. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 25-048 // 2025

    Visibly Fair Mechanisms

    Priority-based allocation often requires eliminating justified envy, making serial dictatorship (SD) the only non-wasteful direct mechanism with that property. However, SD’s outcomes can conflict with the…