Publications of the Research Unit Market Design

  1. Refereed Journal // forthcoming

    Worst-Case Equilibria in First-Price Auctions

    The usual analysis of bidding in first-price auctions assumes that bidders know the distribution of valuations. We analyze first-price auctions in which bidders do not know the precise distribution of…

  2. Discussion and Working Paper // forthcoming

    Strategies under distributional and strategic uncertaint

    I investigate the decision problem which arises in a game of incomplete information under two different types of uncertainty - uncertainty about other players’ type distributions and about other players’…

  3. Refereed Journal // 2024

    Combinatorial auctions for renewable energy – potentials and challenges

    Combinatorial auctions, which allow bidders to bid not only on individual items but also on packages of items and to express complementary and substitute relationships between items, have rarely been used for…

  4. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 23-051 // 2023

    Revenue Maximization with Partially Verifiable Information

    I consider a seller selling a good to bidders with two-dimensional private information: their valuation for a good and their characteristic. While valuations are non-verifiable, characteristics are partially…

  5. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 23-050 // 2023

    Mechanism Design for Unequal Societies

    We study optimal mechanisms for a utilitarian designer who seeks to assign a finite number of goods to a group of ex ante heterogeneous agents with unit demand. The agents have heterogeneous marginal utilities…

  6. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 23-043 // 2023

    Information Asymmetry and Search Intensity

    In markets where sellers’ marginal costs of production have a common component, they have informational advantage over buyers regarding those costs. This information asymmetry between sellers and buyers is…