Publications of the Research Unit Market Design

  1. Refereed Journal // 2025

    Analysis of a capacity-based redispatch mechanism

    This paper discusses a capacity-based redispatch mechanism in which awarded market participants are compensated for their availability for redispatch, rather than activation. The rationale is to develop a market…

  2. Non-Refereed Journal // 2025

    Frühe Leistungsdifferenzierung und ihre Konsequenzen: Lehren aus Ungarn für das dreigliedrige Schulsystem

    Schultracking basiert auf der frühen Aufteilung von Lernenden nach Leistung, doch seine Wirkung auf Kompetenzentwicklung ist empirisch unklar. Wir zeigen, dass ein breiterer Zugang zum Gymnasium…

  3. Non-Refereed Journal // 2025

    Mit Ungeduld zu besseren umweltfreundlichen Subventionen

    Subventionen für nachhaltige Produkte sind ein weit verbreitetes umweltpolitisches Instrument. Allerdings sind sie häufig ineffizient, da sie nach dem Gießkannenprinzip vergeben werden und somit auch…

  4. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 25-023 // 2025

    Sorting, Status, and Shadow Education: How Track Placement Shapes Parental Investment

    Educational tracking—separating students into tracks or schools by ability — is commonplace, but access and preferences for top programs often depend on socioeconomic status (SES), reinforcing inequality. We…

  5. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 25-009 // 2025

    Bidding for Subsidies With One’s Patience

    We study the problem of distributing subsidies in a market that includes both marginal individuals in need of assistance and infra-marginal individuals who would purchase the subsidized product without…

  6. Refereed Journal // 2025

    Strategic Inattention in Product Search

    Rapid technological developments in online markets fundamentally change the relationship between consumers and sellers. Online platforms can easily gather data about consumers’ search behavior, allowing for…

  7. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 24-084 // 2024

    Information Design With Frame Choice

    We study how framing interplays with information design. Whereas Sender conceives all contingencies separately, Receiver cannot initially distinguish among some of them, i.e., has a coarse frame. To influence…

  8. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 24-081 // 2024

    An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism With Covert Information Acquisition

    We examine a setting of independent private value auctions where bidders can covertly acquire gradual information about their valuations. We demonstrate that a dynamic pivot mechanism implements the rst-best…