Publications of the Research Unit Market Design

  1. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 26-041 // 2026

    Why Don’t Donors Deduct? Social Norms and the Limits of Tax Incentives

    Many donors leave tax benefits unclaimed even when doing so requires minimal effort and yields meaningful financial rewards. Findings from our representative survey point to confusion about how to deduct…

  2. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 26-040 // 2026

    The Cost of Fairness in Electricity Markets

    European policymakers argue that bidding zones with uniform prices ensure fairness in electricity markets. Since the outcome of such a fair spot market is often infeasible due to network constraints, a second…

  3. #ZEWPodcast // 2026

    (Concise) EARIE Exclusive: How Pricing Algorithms Are Changing the Competitive Landscape (in German)

    Online retailers often adjust their prices automatically. To do so, they use repricing tools in which algorithms respond to competitors’ prices. A new experimental study shows that even small elements of the…

  4. Refereed Journal // 2026

    A Small Volume Reduction that Melts Down the Market: Auctions with Endogenous Rationing

    Auctions with endogenous rationing are motivated by the regulatory requirement of so-called proportionality of public support and are used to allocate support for renewable energy. They reduce the auctioned…

  5. #ZEWPodcast // 2026

    How Are School Placements Assigned? (in German)

    How equitable are educational pathways, and what are the consequences of early tracking of students? ZEW economist Thilo Klein from the “Market Design” research department and economist Sarah McNamara from the…

  6. Refereed Journal // 2026

    Booster draft mechanisms for multi-object assignment

    We describe a new class of mechanisms—referred to as booster draft mechanisms—for allocating indivisible objects among n individuals with responsive preferences. Specifically, n individuals are assigned m

  7. Refereed Journal // 2026

    Asylum Assignment and Burden-Sharing

    We analyze the problem of matching asylum seekers to member states, incorporating wait times, preferences of asylum seekers, and the priorities, capacities, and burden-sharing commitments of member states. We…

  8. Refereed Journal // 2026

    Congestion Management Games in Electricity Markets

    This paper proposes a game-theoretic model to analyze the strategic behavior of inc-dec gaming in market-based congestion management (redispatch). We extend existing models by considering incomplete information…