We study optimal auctions in a symmetric private values setting, where bidders have signaling concerns: they care about winning the object and a receiver's inference about their type. Signaling concerns arise in…
Educational tracking – separating students into different classes, tracks, or schools based on ability – is relatively commonplace worldwide, despite mixed evidence concerning how it affects student outcomes.…
Banning money in markets for goods like education or health is a common policy to prevent unfair access by the wealthy. We investigate whether this policy is well-targeted for its intended goal. For this, we…
Priority-based allocation often requires eliminating justified envy, making serial dictatorship (SD) the only non-wasteful direct mechanism with that property. However, SD’s outcomes can conflict with the…
We investigate profit-share auctions in a procurement context,comparing them with traditional cash auctions to identify which mechanism yields lower expenses for buyers. We also explore whether specifying a high…
This paper proposes a game-theoretic model to analyze the strategic behavior of incdec gaming in market-based congestion management (redispatch). We extend existing models by considering incomplete information…
We investigate how buyer-supplier communication affects procurement prices, comparing auctions without direct communication to negotiations allowing it. In controlled experiments involving students and…