Publikationen des Forschungsbereichs Marktdesign

  1. Referierte Fachzeitschrift // forthcoming

    Asylum Assignment and Burden-Sharing

  2. Referierte Fachzeitschrift // 2025

    Auctions with signaling bidders: Optimal design and information disclosure

    We study optimal auctions in a symmetric private values setting, where bidders have signaling concerns: they care about winning the object and a receiver's inference about their type. Signaling concerns arise in…

  3. ZEW policy brief Nr. 25-10 // 2025

    Rethinking Tracking: Lessons from Hungary for German Education Reform

    Educational tracking – separating students into different classes, tracks, or schools based on ability – is relatively commonplace worldwide, despite mixed evidence concerning how it affects student outcomes.…

  4. ZEW Discussion Paper Nr. 25-072 // 2025

    When Money Shouldn’t Buy

    Banning money in markets for goods like education or health is a common policy to prevent unfair access by the wealthy. We investigate whether this policy is well-targeted for its intended goal. For this, we…

  5. ZEW Discussion Paper Nr. 25-048 // 2025

    Visibly Fair Mechanisms

    Priority-based allocation often requires eliminating justified envy, making serial dictatorship (SD) the only non-wasteful direct mechanism with that property. However, SD’s outcomes can conflict with the…