We analyze the bidding behavior in a strictly descending multi-unit auction where the price decreases continuously without going back to the initial start price once an object is sold. We prove that any equilibrium in the multi-unit descending auction is inefficient. We derive a symmetric equilibrium for general distribution functions as well as an arbitrary number of bidders and objects. Moreover, equilibrium bidding is characterized by a set of initial value problems. Our analysis thus generalizes previous results in the literature.

Gretschko, Vitali, Alexander Rasch und Achim Wambach (2014), On the strictly descending multi-unit auction, Journal of Mathematical Economics 50, 79–85. Download


Gretschko, Vitali
Rasch, Alexander
Wambach, Achim


Discriminatory descending auction, Dutch auction, First-price sealed-bid auction, Multi-unit auction