Prof. Dr. Vitali Gretschko is head of the ZEW Research Department "Market Design", Professor of Market Design at the University of Mannheim, and a member of the Research Unit "Design and Behavior" at the German Research Foundation (DFG).
Gretschko studied mathematics at the University of Münster before working as a business consultant at Accenture. Between 2009 and 2012 Gretschko completed a doctoral degree in economics at the University of Cologne, under the supervision of Achim Wambach. During this time he spent nine months as a guest researcher at Yale University in Connecticut. Having completed his doctorate, Vitali Gretschko became a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Cologne and worked as a project leader at TWS Partners.
Vitali Gretschko's research interests extend across the field of market design, although he is particularly interested in mechanism design, applied auction theory and contract theory. Amongst other publications, Gretschko has published his work in the RAND Journal of Economics, in Economic Theory, Experimental Economics, and the Journal of Mathematical Economics. Vitali Gretschko also has ample experience in the practical application of market design and in providing market participants with strategic advice.
Articles in Refereed Journals
Mass, Helene, Nicolas Fugger, Vitali Gretschko and Achim Wambach (2020), Imitation perfection - a simple rule to prevent discrimination in procurement, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 12(3), 189-245. Download
Gretschko, Vitali (2019), A Procurement Mechanism to Assign Refugee Quotas: Comment, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 175 (1) , 53-57 . Download
Bichler, Martin, Vitali Gretschko and Maarten Janssen (2017), Bargaining in spectrum auctions: A review of the German 2015 LTE auction, Telecommunication Policy.
Gretschko, Vitali and Achim Wambach (2016), Procurement under public scrutiny: Auctions vs. negotiations, RAND Journal of Economics 47, 914-934. Download
Gretschko, Vitali and Achim Wambach (2014), Information acquisition during a descending auction, Economic Theory 55, 731-751. Download
Articles in Non-Refereed Journals
Gretschko, Vitali, Nicolas Fugger and Philippe Gillen (2016), Beschaffungskonflikte: Volkswagen und seine Zulieferer, Wirtschaftsdienst 96. Jahrgang,Heft 9, Seite 626-627. Download
Monographs, Contributions to Edited Volumes
Ashour Novirdoust, Amir, Rajon Bhuiyan, Martin Bichler, Hans Ulrich Buhl, Gilbert Fridgen, Carina Fugger, Vitali Gretschko, Lisa Hanny, Johannes Knörr, Karsten Neuhoff, Christoph Neumann, Marion Ott, Jörn C. Richstein, Maximilian Rinck, Felix Röhrich, Michael Schöpf, Amelie Sitzmann, Johannes Wagner and Martin Weibelzahl (2021), Electricity Market Design 2030-2050: Moving Towards Implementation, DOI: 10.24406/fit-n-640928. Download
Ashour Novirdoust, Amir, Martin Bichler, Caroline Bojung, Hans Ulrich Buhl, Gilbert Fridgen, Vitali Gretschko, Lisa Hanny, Johannes Knörr, Felipe Maldonado, Karsten Neuhoff, Christoph Neumann, Marion Ott, Jörn C. Richstein, Maximilian Rinck, Michael Schöpf, Paul Schott, Amelie Sitzmann, Johannes Wagner, Jonathan Wagner and Martin Weibelzahl (2021), Electricity Spot Market Design 2030–2050, DOI: 10.24406/fit-n-621457. Download
Gretschko, Vitali, Stephan Knapek and Achim Wambach (2017), Bidding Complexities in Combinatorial Clock Auctions, in: Martin Bichler and Jacob Gorree Cambridge University Press.
Discussion and Working Papers
Gretschko, Vitali and Achim Wambach (2021), Stellungnahme zu Grundsätzen und Szenarien für die Bereitstellung der Mobilfunkfrequenzen, ZEW expert brief No. 21-07, Mannheim. Download
Gretschko, Vitali and Marion Ott (2021), Ein flexibles Vergütungskonzept für Mediziner hilft, Herdenimmunität gegen COVID-19 zu erreichen, ZEW policy brief No. 21-03, Mannheim. Download
Gretschko, Vitali and Helene Mass (2018), Endogenous Worst-Case Beliefs in First-Price Auctions, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 18-056, Mannheim. Download
Gretschko, Vitali and Achim Wambach (2017), Contract (Re-)Negotiation with Private and Common Values, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 17-056, Mannheim. Download
Gretschko, Vitali, Stephan Knapek and Achim Wambach (2013), Spectrum Aggregation Limits in Auctions with Spectrum below 1 GHz: the European Experience, FCC, Munich. Download
- Project Duration 01.03.2019 - 31.12.2022Market design for food donations
- Project Duration 01.06.2018 - 30.11.2022Market Design by Public Authorities
- Project Duration 09.01.2017 - 31.12.2021Redesign of childcare allocation procedures in Germany
- Project Duration 01.05.2020 - 31.05.2021Market design for the integration of renewable energy sources: flexible demand-side adaption and supply-side support
- Project Duration 01.09.2018 - 15.12.2018Market Design for Public Construction Projects – Feasibility Study
- Project Duration 01.12.2017 - 31.08.2018Supporting the Georgian National Communication Commission (GNCC) in Allocating Spectrum Licenses
- Project Duration 09.01.2017 - 31.10.2017Meta-Study on the Optimal Design for Government and Corporate Bond Auctions
- Project Duration 01.01.2015 - 31.12.2017Auctions, Negotiations and Hybrid Mechanisms in Procurement
- 10.2018 – 02.2019 Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, Germany
- 03. – 05.2016 Freie Universität Berlin (FUB), Germany
- 09.2011 – 05.2012 Yale University, New Haven, United States of America (USA)
Organisation of Academic Conferences and Workshops
Prof. Dr. Vitali Gretschko,
Cologne Workshop in Auction and Procurement Design,
Cologne, Germany, 2015
Prof. Dr. Vitali Gretschko,
Cologne Workshop on Procurement Design,
Cologne, Germany, 2014
- Prof. Dr. Vitali Gretschko, Cologne Workshop in Auction and Procurement Design,