The paper presented in this Virtual Market Design Seminar examines the optimal design of a queueing system when agents’ arrival and servicing are governed by general Markov processes. The designer of the system chooses entry and exit rules for agents, their service priority—or queueing discipline—as well as their information, while ensuring that agents have incentives to follow the designer’s recommendations not only to join the queue but more importantly to stay in the queue. The optimal mechanism has a cutoff structure—agents are induced to enter up to a certain queue length and no agents are to exit the queue once they enter the queue; the agents on the queue are served according to a first-come-first-served (FCFS) rule; and they are given no information throughout the process beyond the recommendations they receive from the designer. FCFS is also necessary for optimality in a rich domain. They identify a novel role for queueing disciplines in regulating agents’ beliefs, and their dynamic incentives, revealing a hitherto unrecognized virtue of FCFS in this regard.


Olivier Tercieux

Paris School of Economics, Frankreich

If you would like to participate and to stay up to date about upcoming presentations, please join our mailing list. You will receive the Zoom link for each talk.

The seminar presentations are scheduled to last 60 minutes: 45 minutes of presentation and 15 minutes for both comments and questions.

We will experiment with various methods for questions: A moderator collects questions during the presentation. Speakers will be encouraged to pause every few slides to allow a gap for questions. The moderator will relay clarification questions or unmute selectively during the talk. Remaining questions will be collected and asked in the discussion period.

Just like with other initiated virtual seminars, these rules are subject to change as we gain experience with how to handle the seminar most efficiently.

The idea for this format was borrowed from the Chamberlain Seminar. Other online seminars can be found at the AEA website.

The Virtual Market Design Seminar is an open online alternative to seminars cancelled due to the COVID-19. Seminars will cover all fields from market design. The seminar presentations are scheduled to last 60 minutes, after 45 minutes of presentation, 15 minutes are for both comments and question.


24.05.2021 | 16:00 - 17:00 (CET)