Redistribution, Institutions, and the Self-Selection of Migrants
ZEW Discussion Paper Nr. 26-055 // 2026In the face of slow productivity growth, labor shortages and concerns about brain drain, welfare states seek to understand how policies influence the skill composition of migrants. Using administrative data on the universe of Italians residing abroad, this paper investigates how governmental redistribution and institutional quality shape migration decisions across 45 main destination countries. We find that higher levels of income redistribution are associated with more negative skill selection. Access to human-capital–enhancing public services and higher institutional quality are instead linked to a more positive selection. The latter effects are economically significant and potentially able to offset the adverse effects from redistribution. Complementary quasi-experimental evidence exploiting a drastic deterioration of institutional quality in Italy during the Berlusconi years corroborates these findings. Overall, the evidence suggests that, to the extent that they improve how effectively and equitably they use public resources, welfare states are able to attract a balanced selection of migrants despite high levels of income redistribution.
Villa, Leoluca, Giacomo Corneo und Guido Neidhöfer (2026), Redistribution, Institutions, and the Self-Selection of Migrants, ZEW Discussion Paper Nr. 26-055, Mannheim.