Income Inequality, Bequest Constraints, and Long-Term Public Investment
ZEW Discussion Paper Nr. 26-052 // 2026We propose a model of altruistic dynasties and stochastic intergenerational income mobility in which a government faithfully aggregates household preferences. Inefficient short-termism in the provision of long-lived public goods then arises solely from binding bequest constraints – the legal impossibility of borrowing against one’s children’s future income. When favorable realizations of the children’s productivity process make bequest constraints bind, parent households are reluctant to give up current consumption for their children’s future consumption at the market rate. Whenever a constrained dynasty carries political weight, this opens a wedge between the market-revealed rate and a higher politically-revealed rate that aggregates household preferences. This wedge holds public investment at a positive but inefficiently low level, reconciling such underprovision with positive dynastic altruism. Marginal transfers that relax bequest constraints raise provision, and a golden rule of public finance, with the debt redeemed along a future benefit principle, attains efficient provision in a Pareto-improving way for current voters. In a calibration to five US income quintiles and carbon emission abatement, the politically-revealed rate exceeds the yearly market rate of 2.84% by more than 1.5 percentage points. This wedge holds the carbon price about 27% below the domestic social cost of carbon.
Moretti, Nikolaj, Matthias Kalkuhl und Maximilian Kellner (2026), Income Inequality, Bequest Constraints, and Long-Term Public Investment, ZEW Discussion Paper Nr. 26-052, Mannheim.