1. ZEW Discussion Paper Nr. 25-050 // 2025

    Regulatory Capacity in a Game of Asymmetric Regulation

    In a model of asymmetric regulation, a firm can comply with two regulatory targets, and a regulator can audit the firm for compliance. Inspection by the regulator is imperfect, and it assesses the firm’s…

  2. ZEW Monthly // 2025

    09/2025 – Zukunftsfähigkeit

    Wie sieht unser Gesundheitssystem der Zukunft aus? Wie gestaltet man sinnvolle Innovationspolitik? Und wie können wir nachhaltige Energieversorgung sicherstellen, wenn sich die wirtschaftlichen und…

  3. ZEW Discussion Paper Nr. 25-048 // 2025

    Visibly Fair Mechanisms

    Priority-based allocation often requires eliminating justified envy, making serial dictatorship (SD) the only non-wasteful direct mechanism with that property. However, SD’s outcomes can conflict with the…

  4. ZEW Discussion Paper Nr. 25-047 // 2025

    Rising Energy Prices Without Falling Consumption? The Role of Energy Price Dispersion in a Multi-Product World

    Governments around the world are under pressure to reduce industrial energy use and emissions without losing out to international competition. For this reason, climate policies often come with exemptions or…

  5. ZEW-Finanzmarktreport // 2025

    September 2025

    • Erwartungen stabilisieren sich, aber Verschlechterung der Lage
    • Eurozone: Verbesserung der Konjunkturerwartungen und -lage
    • USA: Konjunkturlage bleibt stabil
    • China: Einschätzungen bleiben weiterhin stabil
    • Negativrevis…
  6. Referierte Fachzeitschrift // 2025

    Staggered Contracts and Unemployment During Recessions

    We analyze the impact of downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) due to collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) on wage and employment dynamics during two major recessions in Spain: the low-inflation recession of…

  7. ZEW Discussion Paper Nr. 25-038 // 2025

    Profit-Share Auctions in Procurement

    We investigate profit-share auctions in a procurement context,comparing them with traditional cash auctions to identify which mechanism yields lower expenses for buyers. We also explore whether specifying a high…