This paper examines the determinants of sector-specific regulation imposed on broadband markets related both to efficiency objectives of regulators and to those of narrowly defined interest groups. We test hypotheses derived from the normative and positive theoretical literature employing recent panel data on 27 European Union member states taking into account endogeneity of the underlying regulation and market structure variables. Our empirical specification employs three different estimators based on instrumental variables in order to identify causal effects. We find evidence supporting both regulators pursuing normative objectives and inefficiencies related to regulatory path dependence, bureaucracy goals and an inadequate consideration of competition from mobile broadband networks. Our results call for adjustments in the institutional design of the decision making process under the current European Union regulatory framework.

Autoren

Briglauer, Wolfgang
Camarda, Enrico Maria
Vogelsang, Ingo

Schlagworte

Broadband markets; “old” and “new” networks; EU regulatory framework; normative theory; positive theory; path dependence; bureaucracy; EU panel data