Educational tracking—separating students into tracks or schools by ability — is commonplace, but access and preferences for top programs often depend on socioeconomic status (SES), reinforcing inequality. We…
We study the problem of distributing subsidies in a market that includes both marginal individuals in need of assistance and infra-marginal individuals who would purchase the subsidized product without…
We study mechanism design with flexible but costly information acquisition. There is a principal and four or more agents, sharing a common prior over a set of payoff- relevant states. The principal proposes a…
We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions on participants’ choice behavior for the…
We study how framing interplays with information design. Whereas Sender conceives all contingencies separately, Receiver cannot initially distinguish among some of them, i.e., has a coarse frame. To influence…
We examine a setting of independent private value auctions where bidders can covertly acquire gradual information about their valuations. We demonstrate that a dynamic pivot mechanism implements the rst-best…