In an artefactual field experiment with a large and heterogeneous non-student population sample, we test the implications of social norms for market interactions associated with negative real- …
We study the optimal entry fee in a symmetric private value first-price auction with signaling, in which the participation decisions and the auction outcome are used by an outside observer to infer the bidders’…
We investigate whether revenue-maximizing auctioneers selling heterogeneous items will allow for combinatorial bidding in the presence of auctioneer competition. We compare the choice of auction format by two…
We design and implement a program-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism with ties (DAT) and apply it to childcare assignment in two German cities. The mechanism can accommodate complementarities in providers'…
This paper shows that the provision of consumer rights can decrease welfare when some consumers remain ignorant of these rights. We find that consumers uninformed about a mandated warranty demand excessively…
We design and implement an iterative, program-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism with ties (IDAT) and apply it to childcare assignment in two German cities. The mechanism can accommodate complementarities…