We study mechanism design with flexible but costly information acquisition. There is a principal and four or more agents, sharing a common prior over a set of payoff-relevant states. The principal proposes a…
This paper proposes a game-theoretic model to analyze the strategic behavior of inc-dec gaming in market-based congestion management (redispatch). We extend existing models by considering incomplete information…
Priority-based allocation often requires eliminating justified envy, making serial dictatorship (SD) the only non-wasteful direct mechanism with that property. However, SD’s outcomes can conflict with the…
We investigate profit-share auctions in a procurement context,comparing them with traditional cash auctions to identify which mechanism yields lower expenses for buyers. We also explore whether specifying a high…
This paper proposes a game-theoretic model to analyze the strategic behavior of inc-dec gaming in market-based congestion management (redispatch). We extend existing models by considering incomplete information…
We investigate how buyer-supplier communication affects procurement prices, comparing auctions without direct communication to negotiations allowing it. In controlled experiments involving students and…