We study the short term effect of the first global multilateral standard for the automatic exchange of information (AEOI), the so called Common Reporting Standard (CRS), on cross border tax evasion. Our sample ranges from the fourth quarter of 2014 to the third quarter of 2017. Employing newly available bilateral data on cross-border deposits, we find that the CRS induced a reduction of 11.9% in cross-border deposits parked in tax havens. Moreover, regardless of the 4,000 bilateral exchange relations created under the CRS, relocation is still a desirable option. More specifically, upon the beginning of the automatic collection of information under the CRS, the United States, which so far did not commit to the CRS, seems to emerge as a potentially attractive country for the relocation of cross-border deposits seeking secrecy.


Tax Evasion, Automatic Exchange of Information, Tax Havens, Cross-Border Deposits.