We investigate how buyer-supplier communication affects procurement prices, comparing auctions without direct communication to negotiations allowing it. In controlled experiments involving students and…
This paper discusses a capacity-based redispatch mechanism in which awarded market participants are compensated for their availability for redispatch, rather than activation. The rationale is to develop a market…
Schultracking basiert auf der frühen Aufteilung von Lernenden nach Leistung, doch seine Wirkung auf Kompetenzentwicklung ist empirisch unklar. Wir zeigen, dass ein breiterer Zugang zum Gymnasium…
Subventionen für nachhaltige Produkte sind ein weit verbreitetes umweltpolitisches Instrument. Allerdings sind sie häufig ineffizient, da sie nach dem Gießkannenprinzip vergeben werden und somit auch…
Educational tracking—separating students into tracks or schools by ability — is commonplace, but access and preferences for top programs often depend on socioeconomic status (SES), reinforcing inequality. We…
We study the problem of distributing subsidies in a market that includes both marginal individuals in need of assistance and infra-marginal individuals who would purchase the subsidized product without…
We study mechanism design with flexible but costly information acquisition. There is a principal and four or more agents, sharing a common prior over a set of payoff-relevant states. The principal proposes a…
We assess the impact of discrimination on Black individuals’ job networks across the U.S. using a two-stage field experiment with 400+ fictitious LinkedIn profiles. In the first stage, we vary race via…