The use of market mechanisms for allocating goods like school slots and courses is hindered by the non-existence of competitive equilibria (CE) when the goods to be allocated are indivisible. To get around this Arrow and Hahn proposed the notion of social-approximate equilibria: a price vector and corresponding demands that 'approximately' clear the market in that the excess demand for goods is 'small'. The paper presented in this ZEW Research Seminar identifies social approximate equilibria where the mismatch between supply and demand is bounded by a parameter $\Delta$ that depends only on agent preferences and not the size of the economy. The parameter $\Delta$ measures the degree of preference complementarity.


Rakesh Vohra

University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA

If you would like to participate and to stay up to date about upcoming presentations, please join our mailing list. You will receive the Zoom link for each talk.

The seminar presentations are scheduled to last 60 minutes: 45 minutes of presentation and 15 minutes for both comments and questions.

We will experiment with various methods for questions: A moderator collects questions during the presentation. Speakers will be encouraged to pause every few slides to allow a gap for questions. The moderator will relay clarification questions or unmute selectively during the talk. Remaining questions will be collected and asked in the discussion period.

Just like with other initiated virtual seminars, these rules are subject to change as we gain experience with how to handle the seminar most efficiently.

The idea for this format was borrowed from the Chamberlain Seminar. Other online seminars can be found at the AEA website.

The Virtual Market Design Seminar is an open online alternative to seminars cancelled due to the COVID-19. Seminars will cover all fields from market design. The seminar presentations are scheduled to last 60 minutes, after 45 minutes of presentation, 15 minutes are for both comments and question.


11.10.2021 | 16:00 - 17:00 (CET)

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