Technology Licensing and the Direction of Innovation
ZEW Discussion Paper No. 26-050 // 2026Previous work shows that when firms choose the direction of their research before how much to invest, a generous patent regime can induce them to inefficiently converge on the same technological area. We ask whether technology licensing, via fixed fees or per-unit royalties, corrects this failure. The answer rests on cross-licensing: under both contracts, the prospect of combining complementary innovations developed along different trajectories can lead firms to differentiate. In a Cournot illustration, the inefficiency survives only when innovations are close substitutes and products are not too differentiated: then the cross-license adds little to what each firm already owns or, when one firm invests more, research along different trajectories becomes a contest to supply the technology both firms use. In the same illustration, lump-sum fees dominate per-unit royalties in terms of welfare. Technology markets and patentability requirements thus appear to be complementary instruments, and antitrust scrutiny should target the terms of cross-licensing agreements rather than the institution itself.
Manenti, Fabio M. and Luca Sandrini (2026), Technology Licensing and the Direction of Innovation, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 26-050, Mannheim.