New European Structures, Persistent National Barriers: The Council Compromise on the MISP
CommentOpinion piece by Achim Wambach and Karolin Kirschenmann
The finance ministers of the EU Member States have agreed on the key elements of the Market Integration and Supervision Package (MISP), a central component of the Savings and Investments Union. The proposals must be judged by whether they actually make it easier for investors and businesses to invest and raise capital across national borders. While it is true that the Council compromise creates new European structures, it is only a partial remedy for national fragmentation. Further reforms are needed within the Savings and Investments Union to mobilise Europe’s private savings more effectively for investment.
Europe is facing major investment challenges. The economic transformation, new technologies and infrastructure will require substantial funding in the coming years. As this is unlikely to be provided solely by state governments or through bank loans, capital markets must play a greater role in financing investment. There is no shortage of private savings in Europe. The challenge is to mobilise these savings for investment: European capital markets remain highly fragmented, and this makes it difficult to channel capital to where it can be put to productive use.
Through the Savings and Investments Union, the European Union aims to reduce this fragmentation. A centrepiece of capital market integration is the MISP, which addresses the following areas where national borders still play a role today.
Distribution of investment funds: While investment funds can, in principle, be sold across borders, they still need to comply with differing national requirements and procedures. The MISP package is designed to remove such barriers, thereby reducing costs for asset managers who operate across borders. One concrete example is the new depositary passport. It is intended to allow funds to also choose a depositary that is located in another Member State. This could increase competition among depositaries and, particularly in smaller markets, widen choice. However, the Council plans to leave it at the discretion of the Member States to introduce this passport. Consequently, the possibility of differing national regulations remains – even though this particular instrument is specifically designed to overcome national borders.
Trading: In securities trading, too, differences between national admission and supervisory structures can prevent providers from taking full advantage of the size of the European market. The proposed new status of Pan-European Market Operator (PEMO) would allow stock exchange operators to run several trading venues in different Member States under a single licence. Participation in the PEMO system is voluntary. Operators that choose to opt in will be supervised directly by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). In economic terms, this is plausible in principle: Those who want to operate across Europe are offered a European authorisation and supervision regime, while trading venues with a stronger national focus are not forced into it. However, whether this voluntary European route is attractive enough to really produce more pan-European trading structures remains to be seen.
Clearing and settlement: A transaction does not end with the conclusion of a securities trade. It is only completed after the securities and payments have been settled and, in the case of transactions subject to clearing, offset via a central counterparty. This infrastructure, too, is fragmented along national borders in Europe, which is why the package also seeks to remove cross-border barriers in post-trade structures. From an economic perspective, this is a crucial starting point. Common rules for trading will not be sufficient to create a single capital market if the subsequent settlement of cross-border transactions gives rise to additional costs and interfaces. However, the extent to which the Council compromise actually dismantles these barriers can only be assessed conclusively once the negotiating position has been finalised.
New technologies: The existing pilot scheme for trading and settlement is to be expanded based on distributed ledger technology. The Council has agreed to broaden the scope of financial activities permitted within this pilot scheme. This will allow new solutions to be tested on a larger scale and potentially scaled up beyond individual national markets. It is unclear, however, whether this will result in more efficient trading and settlement structures. A new technology is not a better solution simply because it is new. The decisive factor is whether it reduces transaction costs or offers other advantages over existing infrastructures.
Supervision: The question of the level at which capital markets should be supervised is particularly controversial. Where market participants and infrastructures are smaller and operate predominantly at national level, there is a strong case for national supervision. The authorities are familiar with the markets and the supervised entities. Nevertheless, as cross-border activity increases, this division of responsibilities can become an obstacle. Firms then have to deal with several supervisory authorities, which may interpret European rules differently. Stronger European supervision may therefore be appropriate where market participants or market infrastructures have a corresponding cross-border significance. Centralised supervision is thus not an end in itself: What matters is that the level of supervision matches the economic reach of the supervised entities.
The Council has agreed to extend direct supervision by the European supervisory authority ESMA to the most significant cross-border trading venues and to significant central securities depositories (CSDs) and central counterparties (CCPs). In the case of crypto-asset service providers (CASPs), too, only the most significant cross-border providers are to be directly supervised by ESMA. In adopting this approach, the Council is essentially following the principle of strengthening European supervision where the supervised markets and entities have a corresponding European reach.
Yet the decisive factor is how this reach is determined. If a market’s European significance is tied too closely to its current cross-border activity, there is a risk of a circular argument: A market remains under national supervision because it is organised nationally, even though the aim of the reform is to overcome this national fragmentation. The criteria should therefore not only take into account the current geographical reach but should also adequately map the economic significance of a market participant or market infrastructure for the European capital market. Against this backdrop, the Council compromise raises questions, as it would likely leave parts of Deutsche Börse under national supervision. Germany in particular should be expected to show greater European ambition in integrating Europe's capital markets.
The Banking Union shows what supervision differentiated according to economic significance can look like. Even in that system, not all banks are supervised directly by the ECB. Significant institutions are subject to direct European supervision, whereas smaller institutions remain under the supervision of national authorities within a common European supervisory framework. The underlying idea is similar: The level of supervision should match the economic reach of the supervised institutions. Yet the Banking Union also shows what common supervision cannot achieve: Despite single European banking supervision, the banking market remains largely national in character. Differences in areas such as tax, insolvency or consumer protection law are not overcome by merely organising supervision at European level.
The same is broadly true of capital markets: Common supervision can reduce differences in how European rules are applied. Still, as it does not eliminate other causes of market fragmentation, it is crucial for the MISP to not focus solely on supervision but also addresses obstacles in fund distribution, trading and market infrastructure. Overall, the Council compromise thus tackles relevant barriers to integration and is a move in the right direction. The PEMO creates a European framework for operators wishing to operate across borders, and supervision is to be organised to a greater extent at the European level for market participants and market infrastructures with a corresponding economic reach. In other areas, however, integration remains dependent on national decisions. This is particularly evident in the case of the depositary passport, the introduction of which is left to the Member States. Ultimately, the package must be judged by whether it makes it easier and more cost-effective for investors and companies to invest and raise capital across national borders.
Yet this also highlights the limits of what the MISP is intended to achieve. Better-integrated markets facilitate the channelling of capital across Europe to where it can be put to productive use. Nevertheless, better market integration does not yet ensure that private savings are available on a larger scale for capital market investments. This is where other elements of the Savings and Investments Union come into play: for example, the question of how households save for retirement, and the conditions under which pension funds, insurance companies and other institutional investors can invest these funds. The MISP can thus create an important prerequisite for better capital allocation. However, progress must also be made on the other components of the Savings and Investments Union if Europe’s substantial private savings are to be mobilised more effectively for investment.
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