Friends in High Places

The paper presented in this PRICE Seminar investigates the causal effects of attaining authority on individual and network productivity within organizations. Using data from the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), a global body that develops Internet standards, the authors exploit a rare case of randomized leadership assignment: each year, members of the IETF’s Nominating Committee (NomCom) are chosen at random from a pool of qualified volunteers. This natural experiment allows them to isolate the impact of holding authority from individual characteristics typically correlated with leadership selection. They find that being randomly selected into the NomCom significantly increases an individual’s subsequent productivity, as measured by the number of Internet standards authored, patents filed, and patent citations. Moreover, this productivity spillover extends to the selected individual’s professional network, particularly co-authors, whose output also increases. These effects are especially pronounced when the appointed leader has a smaller pre-existing network or is female, suggesting that diversity and network position amplify leadership externalities. Their findings provide novel causal evidence that temporary authority fosters both personal and collective productivity growth, highlighting the enduring benefits of leadership experiences and their potential to reshape networks of innovation.