How to Beat FCFS
Research Seminars: Virtual Market Design SeminarThe paper presented in this Virtual Market Design Seminar studies two observable queues with identical service rates, serving agents who arrive stochastically over time. Agents join the queue that minimizes their expected waiting time. Assuming one queue uses the ubiquitous First Come-First-Served (FCFS) service rule, the authors show that by simply modifying its service order, the other queue can capture a strict majority of the demand. They establish an upper bound on the arrival share any rule can capture against FCFS. When both queues can design their service order, the paper shows a novel variant of Last-Come-First-Served (LCFS) is an equilibrium in a low congestion regime. Without commitment, the picture changes, and there is an equilibrium where both queues use FCFS, and agents route to the queue with the shorter waitlist.
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