The presented paper in this Virtual Market Design Seminar analyze the implications of introducing priority service on customers' welfare. In monopoly markets, introducing priority service decreases the customers' surplus despite increasing the assignment efficiency: the monopolist extracts from customers a total payment higher than the total efficiency gain generated by the service and hence leaves customers worse off compared with the situation where no priority is offered at all. In duopoly markets with homogeneous customers the equilibrium price and customers' welfare coincide with the monopoly outcome where this monopolist faces half of the market. With heterogeneous customers priority can improve the aggregated customers' welfare, yet in equilibrium service providers extract a very substantial part of the gains of the improved allocation. Their conclusion is that priority service erects barriers to competition that are embedded in the nature of the service provided, with the victims of these barriers primarily being agents with low willingness or low ability to pay for the priority.


Eyal Winter

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel und Lancaster University, Vereinigtes Königreich


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Seminar rules

The seminar presentations are scheduled to last 60 minutes: 45 minutes of presentation and 15 minutes for both comments and questions.

We will experiment with various methods for questions: A moderator collects questions during the presentation. Speakers will be encouraged to pause every few slides to allow a gap for questions. The moderator will relay clarification questions or unmute selectively during the talk. Remaining questions will be collected and asked in the discussion period.

Just like with other initiated virtual seminars, these rules are subject to change as we gain experience with how to handle the seminar most efficiently.

The idea for this format was borrowed from the Chamberlain Seminar. Other online seminars can be found at the AEA website.


27.07.2020 | 16:00 - 17:00

Event Location

Online via ZOOM

  • Market Design