Publications of the Research Unit Market Design

  1. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 23-043 // 2023

    Information Asymmetry and Search Intensity

    In markets where sellers’ marginal costs of production have a common component, they have informational advantage over buyers regarding those costs. This information asymmetry between sellers and buyers is…

  2. Refereed Journal // 2023

    A market design solution to a multi-category housing allocation problem

    We study multi-category housing allocation problems: A set of objects, which is sorted into categories of equal size, has to be allocated to a set of individuals, such that everyone obtains exactly one object…

  3. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 23-038 // 2023

    The Benefits of Auctioneer Competition: Merging Auctions and Adding Auctioneers

    In a lab experiment, we analyze the benefits of increasing competition on auction platforms hosting multiple auctioneers of a homogeneous good. We find that increasing competition by merging separated individual…

  4. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 23-029 // 2023

    Full Surplus Extraction from Colluding Bidders

    I consider a repeated auction setting with colluding buyers and a seller who adjusts reserve prices over time without long-term commitment. To model the seller’s concern for collusion, I introduce a new…

  5. Non-Refereed Journal // 2023

    Effiziente und faire Verteilung von Lebensmittelspenden

    Die Ziele für nachhaltige Entwicklung der Vereinten Nationen sehen eine Halbierung der Lebensmittelverschwendung bis 2030 vor. Ein Ziel, zu dem die Tafeln für Deutschland auch durch eine optimierte Verteilung…

  6. Refereed Journal // 2023

    The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice

    We compare the outcomes of the most prominent strategy-proof and stable algorithm (Deferred Acceptance, DA) and the most prominent strategy-proof and Pareto optimal algorithm (Top Trading Cycles, TTC) to the…