Favoritism by the Governing Elite

In this paper, we study the extent to which ministers engage in regional favoritism. We are
the first to provide a comprehensive analysis of a larger set of the governing elite, not just
focusing on the primary leader. We manually collect birthplaces of this governing elite globally.
Combining this information with extended nighttime luminosity and novel population data
over the period from 1992 to 2016, we utilize a staggered difference-in-differences estimator
and find that birthplaces of ministers globally emit on average roughly 9 % more nightlight.
This result is predominantly attributable to the African sub-sample. We find no evidence that
the measured effect is driven by, or induces, migration to the home regions of ministers. The
size of our data set lets us investigate heterogeneities along a number of dimensions: political
power, ministerial portfolio, and the institutional setting.

Birkholz, Carlo Moana, Zareh Asatryan, Thushyanthan Baskaran und Patrick Hufschmidt (2023), Favoritism by the Governing Elite, Ruhr Economic Papers, Essen