In an experiment on sequential rent-seeking, we find that the theoretically predicted first-mover advantage does not exist empirically. Rather, a second-mover advantage can be observed. Though the subgame perfect equilibrium can not prevail in experiment, individual behavior is highly reasonable nevertheless, such that subjects appear to play reduced form of the original game. We also observe that the efficient fair outcome can not be achieved because of the exploitation opportunity of the second mover. The observed beavior is quite different from that in ultimatum and trust game experiments.

Weimann, Joachim, Chun-Lei Yang und Carsten Vogt (2000), An experiment on sequential rent-seeking, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization Vol. 41, 405-426.

Autoren

Weimann, Joachim
Yang, Chun-Lei
Vogt, Carsten

Schlagworte

Rent Seeking, experimental economics, bounded rationality