We study the short-term effect of the first global multilateral standard for the automatic exchange of information (AEOI), the so-called Common Reporting Standard (CRS), on cross-border tax evasion. Employing newly available bilateral data on cross-border deposits, we find that the CRS induced a reduction of 11.5% in cross-border deposits parked in tax havens. However, despite the 4000 bilateral information exchange relations created under the CRS, deposit relocation is still an option for secrecy-seeker. We find that the United States, which did not commit to the CRS, emerges as an attractive location for cross-border deposits.

Casi, Elisa, Christoph Spengel und Barbara Stage (2020), Cross border tax evasion after the common reporting standard: game over?, Journal of Public Economics 190, 104-240. Download

Autoren

Casi, Elisa
Spengel, Christoph
Stage, Barbara

Schlagworte

Tax evasion, Automatic exchange of information, Tax havens, Cross-border deposits