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Aktuelle Veranstaltungen

  1. Investment Incentives in Near-Optimal Mechanisms

    23.11.2020 · Veranstaltungen für die Wissenschaft Research Seminare: Virtual Market Design Seminar

    Redner: Shengwu Li (Harvard University, Cambridge, USA)

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  1. Ironing, Sweeping, and Multivariate Majorization Optimal Mechanisms for Mass-Produced Goods
    26.10.2020,
    Research Seminare: Virtual Market Design Seminar
  2. Fair Allocation of Vaccines, Ventilators and Antiviral Treatments Leaving No Ethical Value Behind in Health Care Rationing
    12.10.2020,
    Research Seminare: Virtual Market Design Seminar
  3. Early-Career Discrimination: Spiraling or Self-Correcting?
    28.09.2020,
    Research Seminare: Virtual Market Design Seminar
  4. Exposure to Grocery Prices and Inflation Expectations
    14.09.2020,
    Research Seminare: Virtual Market Design Seminar
  5. Exploitative Priority Service
    27.07.2020,
    Research Seminare: Virtual Market Design Seminar
  6. Test Design Under Undetectable Falsification
    13.07.2020,
    Research Seminare: Virtual Market Design Seminar
  7. Inaccurate Statistical Discrimination
    29.06.2020,
    Research Seminare: Virtual Market Design Seminar
  8. Just a Few Seeds More: Value of Network Information for Diffusion
    15.06.2020,
    Research Seminare: Virtual Market Design Seminar
  9. Electricity Markets in Transition
    01.06.2020,
    Research Seminare: Virtual Market Design Seminar
  10. Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications
    18.05.2020,
    Research Seminare: Virtual Market Design Seminar