

CURRENT POSITIONS

- Head of research group Market Design, ZEW Mannheim
 - Professor for Market Design, University of Mannheim
 - Industrieökonomischer Ausschuss
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PREVIOUS ACADEMIC POSITIONS

- Visiting Researcher: Bonn University, Cologne University, Freie Universität Berom
 - Akademischer Rat (a.Z.) at the University of Cologne, Department of Economics
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EDUCATION

- Doctoral degree, Economics, *summa cum laude*, University of Cologne
Thesis committee: Axel Ockenfels, Patrick Schmitz, Achim Wambach (advisor)
 - Visiting Research Assistant at the Yale University (advisor: Dirk Bergemann)
 - Diploma, Mathematics, University of Muenster (M.Sc. equivalent)
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INDUSTRY POSITIONS

- Project leader (market design and negotiation strategy) at TWS Partners AG
 - IT-Consultant (change management, big data) at Accenture
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PUBLICATIONS

• Publications in refereed journals:

- *Imitation perfection: A simple rule to prevent discrimination in procurement*, **American Economic Journal: Microeconomics**, 12 (3), 189-245 (2020) (joint with H. Mass, N. Fugger und A. Wambach)
- *A procurement mechanism to assign refugee quotas*, **Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics**, 175 (1), 53-57 (2019)
- *Bargaining in spectrum auctions: A review of the German 2015 LTE auction*, **Telecommunication Policy** 41, (5), 303-532 (2017) (joint with M. Bichler and M. Janssen),
- *Pre-auction or post-auction certification?*, **Economic Theory Bulletin** , 5, 139-150 (2017) (joint with P. Gillen and A. Rasch)
- *Procurement under public scrutiny: Auctions vs. negotiations*, **RAND Journal of Economics**, 47 (4), 914-934 (2016) (joint with A. Wambach)
- *Excess information acquisition in auctions*, **Experimental Economics**, 18 (3), 335-355 (2015) (joint with A. Rajko)
- *Information acquisition during a descending auction*, **Economic Theory**, 55, 731-751 (2014) (joint with A. Wambach)
- *On the strictly descending multi-unit auction*, **Journal of Mathematical Economics**, 50, 79-85 (2014) (joint with A. Rasch and A. Wambach)

• Working Paper:

- *Dynamic procurement with incomplete contracts*, revise and resubmit in **Management Science** (joint with M. Pollrich)

- *Subjective-belief worst-case equilibria in first-price auctions*, revise and resubmit in **Theoretical Economics** (joint with H. Mass)
 - *Common values and the Coase conjecture: Inefficiencies in frictionless contract renegotiation*, reject and resubmit in **Games and Economic Behavior** (joint with A. Wambach)
 - *Sequential procurement with limited commitment* (joint with N. Fugger und M. Pollich)
 - *Contract design without commitment* (joint with A. Wambach)
 - *Social norms and market behavior – Evidence from a large population sample* (joint with T. Riem, N. Fugger, P. Gillen, P. Werner)
- **Work in progress:**
 - *Auctions vs. negotiations: Evidence from procurement professionals* (joint with N. Fugger, P. Gillen, G. Kokott, T. Riem)
 - *You know me* (joint with N. Fugger, M. Praxmarer)
- **Book chapters:**
 - *Bidding complexities in Combinatorial Clock Auctions*, **Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design**, Cambridge University Press (joint with S. Knappek and A. Wambach)
 - *Sustainable Procurement*, forthcoming in **CSR and Business Models**, Springer (joint with F. Haas)
- **Further publications:**
 - *Volkswagen und seine Zulieferer: Beschaffungskonflikte in der Automobilindustrie*, Wirtschaftsdienst, 09/2016, (joint with N. Fugger and P. Gillen)
 - *Die Regeln machen den Unterschied: Marktdesign*, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium (joint with T. Klein and A. Wambach)
- **In the media:**
 - *Dans une société qui utilise les enchères au quotidien, l'originalité des travaux de Paul Milgrom et Robert Wilson nous est précieuse*, LeMonde (joint with O. Bos)
 - *L'attribution des fréquences 5G, une déception sans surprise*, Les Echos (joint with O. Bos)
 - *Méthode d'attribution des fréquences 5G: de choix discutables*, Les Echos (joint with O. Bos)
 - *Allemagne: ces enchères 5G qui n'en finissent plus...*, Les Echos
 - *Die 5G Auktion hatte gravierende Schwächen*, Wirtschaftswoche (joint with A. Wambach)
 - *Bieterschlacht der Telkoriesen*, Handelsblatt
 - *Die Lizenz zum Schnellsurfen*, Tagesspiegel
 - *Finale im Milliardenpiel*, Süddeutsche Zeitung
 - *Mobiles Internet für alle, aber richtig*, Süddeutsche Zeitung, (joint with A. Wambach)
 - *Die Mär der totalen Transparenz*, Wirtschaftswoche,
 - *Plötzlich nützlich*, Der Volkswirt, Wirtschaftswoche,
 - *Teuer, teurer, am teuersten: Immer neue Rekordpreise für Diamanten*, Augsburgener Allgemeine,
 - *Warum totale Transparenz auch kontraproduktiv sein kann*, Wirtschaftswoche (joint with A. Sanches)
 - *Von der Analyse zum Design der Märkte*, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (joint with A. Wambach)
- **Policy Reports:**
 - *Spectrum Aggregation Limits in Auctions with Spectrum below 1 GHz: the European Experience*, filed with the **FCC** in December 2013 (joint with S. Knappek and A. Wambach)

TALKS AT CONFERENCES

ESEM (2018), Game Theory Society World Congress (2016), IIOC (2017, 2016), EARIE (2017, 2016, 2015), Verein für Socialpolitik (2019, 2017, 2016, 2015), Society for Economic Design (2017, 2015), EEA (2017, 2015, 2012), JEI (2019, 2016, 2015, 2014, 2012, 2010), SMYE (2009)

INVITED SEMINARS AND WORKSHOPS

Aachen University (2019), JITE Conference (2018), EUI/Cologne Conference on Market Design (2016), Edinburgh University (2016), Vienna University (2016), Paderborn University (2016), Mannheim University (2016), ZEW Mannheim (2016), HU Berlin (2015), University of Muenster (2015), TU Munich (2015), Duesseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (2014), Maastricht University (2014), Yale University (2011, 2012), PennState University (2012)

REFEREE

ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Econometrica, Economic Theory, European Journal of Operations Research, Games and Economic Behavior, German Economic Review, Information Economics and Policy, International Economic Review, Journal of Public Economics, Journal of Economic Theory, Management Science, Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Spring Meeting of Young Economists

(CO-)ORGANIZED WORKSHOPS

Virtual Market Design Seminar, MaCCI Conference on Law and Economics (2018), ZEW-KIT-Paris2 Workshop on Market Design (2019, 2018, 2017), Cologne Workshop on Auctions and Procurement (2015, 2014), Paris-Cologne workshop on Recent Developments in Market Design (2011)

SCHOLARSHIPS

German National Academic Foundation (Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes), Fulbright Commission