In this paper, the author analyzes long-term contracting in insurance markets with asymmetric information. A buyer privately observes her risk type, which evolves stochastically over time. A long-
A monopolist seller of multiple goods screens a buyer whose type is initially unknown to both but drawn from a commonly known distribution. The buyer privately learns about his type via a signal.
The use of market mechanisms for allocating goods like school slots and courses is hindered by the non-existence of competitive equilibria (CE) when the goods to be allocated are indivisible. To g
The paper presented in this Virtual Market Design Seminar examines the optimal design of a queueing system when agents’ arrival and servicing are governed by general Markov processes. The designer
Policymakers frequently use price regulations as a response to inequality in the markets they control. In the paper presented in this Virtual Market Design Seminar, the authors examine the optimal