Meta-Study on the Optimal Design for Government and Corporate Bond Auctions

Meta-Study on the Optimal Design for Government and Corporate Bond Auctions

The aim of the project is to provide an extensive overview of the current theoretical and empirical literature on the efficiency of mechanisms to issue government bonds. This overview supports decision makers in identifying important criteria regarding the design of bond auctions and in selecting the optimal mechanism.The literature overview is conducted with respect to the following three dimensions:

  1. Comparison of uniform-price and discriminatory auctions
  2. Bidders behavior and optimal design of incentives
  3. Alternative auction designs

Project members

Tobias Riehm

Tobias Riehm

Project Coordinator
Researcher

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Vitali Gretschko

Vitali Gretschko

Research Associate

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Contact

Tobias Riehm
Researcher
Tobias Riehm
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