Cartel agreements between firms typcially aim at reducing competition and increasing joint profits. Due to the fact that such agreements regularly cause substantial economic harm in the form of elevated prices and reduced innovation activities, cartels are a major infringement of competition laws in Germany and the European Union.
After the breakdown of cartels, anecdotal evidence often points towards an increased merger activity in the respective industries thereby raising the question whether former cartel members systematically try to replace the lost cartel-related market power by merger-related market power. Against this background, the project aims at investigating a possible relationship between cartel breakdowns and merger activity. As part of this endeavor, we also investigate the question how mergers after cartel breakdowns affect corporate values.

Selected Publications

Articles in Refereed Journals

Hüschelrath, Kai and Florian Smuda (2013), Do Cartel Breakdowns Induce Mergers? Evidence from EC Cartel Cases, European Competition Journal 9 (2), 407-429.

Discussion and Working Papers

Hüschelrath, Kai and Florian Smuda (2013), Do Cartel Breakdowns Induce Mergers? Evidence From EC Cartel Cases, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 13-036, Mannheim. Download

Project duration

01.09.2012 - 31.08.2013

Contact

Prof. Dr. Kai Hüschelrath

Project members

Prof. Dr. Kai Hüschelrath
Dr. Mariela Borell
Dr. Vigen Nikogosian
Florian Smuda

Departments

International Finance and Financial Management · Competition and Regulation