Cartel agreements between firms typcially aim at reducing competition and increasing joint profits. Due to the fact that such agreements regularly cause substantial economic harm in the form of elevated prices and reduced innovation activities, cartels are a major infringement of competition laws in Germany and the European Union.
After the breakdown of cartels, anecdotal evidence often points towards an increased merger activity in the respective industries thereby raising the question whether former cartel members systematically try to replace the lost cartel-related market power by merger-related market power. Against this background, the project aims at investigating a possible relationship between cartel breakdowns and merger activity. As part of this endeavor, we also investigate the question how mergers after cartel breakdowns affect corporate values.
Articles in Refereed Journals
Hüschelrath, Kai and Florian Smuda (2013), Do Cartel Breakdowns Induce Mergers? Evidence from EC Cartel Cases, European Competition Journal 9 (2), 407-429.
Discussion and Working Papers
Hüschelrath, Kai and Florian Smuda (2013), Do Cartel Breakdowns Induce Mergers? Evidence From EC Cartel Cases, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 13-036, Mannheim. Download
Hüschelrath, Kai, Ulrich Laitenberger and Florian Smuda (2012), Cartel Enforcement in the European Union: Determinants of the Duration of Investigations, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 12-071, Mannheim. Download