Publications of the Research Unit Market Design

  1. Refereed Journal // 2019

    The Losses from Integration in Matching Markets can be Large

    Although the integration of two-sided matching markets using stable mechanisms generates expected gains from integration, I show that there are worst case scenarios in which these are negative. The losses…

  2. ZEW Discussion Paper // 2018

    Endogenous Worst-Case Beliefs in First-Price Auctions

    Bidding in first-price auctions crucially depends on the beliefs of the bidders about their competitors' willingness to pay. We analyze bidding behavior in a first-price auction in which the knowledge of the…

  3. ZEW Discussion Paper // 2018

    Strategies under Strategic Uncertainty

    I investigate the decision problem of a player in a game of incomplete information who faces uncertainty about the other players' strategies. I propose a new decision criterion which works in two steps.…

  4. ZEW Discussion Paper // 2018

    Contract Design with Limited Commitment

    We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to contract with a privately informed agent and is not able to commit to not renegotiating any mechanism. That is, we allow the principal, after observing the…