Publications of the Research Unit Market Design

  1. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 20-014 // 2020

    A Small Volume Reduction that Melts Down the Market: Auctions with Endogenous Rationing

    Auctions with endogenous rationing have been introduced to stimulate competition. Such (procurement) auctions reduce the volume put out to tender when competition is low. This paper finds a strong negative…

  2. ZEW expert brief No. 20-03 // 2020

    Homeoffice in Zeiten von Corona

  3. Refereed Journal // 2020

    Multi-unit assignment under dichotomous preferences

    I study the problem of allocating objects among agents without using money. Agents can receive several objects and have dichotomous preferences, meaning that they either consider objects to be acceptable…

  4. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 19-062 // 2019

    Commitment in First-Price Auctions

    We study the role of commitment in a first-price auction environment. We devise a simple two-stage model in which bidders first submit an initial offer that the auctioneer can observe and then make a…

  5. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 19-061 // 2019

    How the Auction Design Influences Procurement Prices: An Experiment

    The targeted design of auctions has to take behavioral regularities into account. This paper explores whether procurement auction formats can take advantage of bidders' willingness-to-pay-willingness-to-accept…