Publications of the Research Unit Market Design

  1. Refereed Journal // 2019

    Multi-unit assignment under dichotomous preferences

    I study the problem of allocating objects among agents without using money. Agents can receive several objects and have dichotomous preferences, meaning that they either consider objects to be acceptable or…

  2. ZEW Discussion Paper // 2019

    Obvious Manipulations in Cake-Cutting

    In cake-cutting, strategy-proofness is a very costly requirement in terms of fairness: for n = 2 it implies a dictatorial allocation, whereas for n ≥ 3 it requires that one agent receives no cake. We show that a…

  3. Contributions to Edited Volumes and... // 2019

    Fair Cake-Cutting in Practice

    Using a lab experiment, we investigate the real-life performance of envy-free and proportional cake-cutting procedures with respect to fairness and preference manipulation. We find that envy-free procedures,…

  4. ZEW Discussion Paper // 2019

    Incomplete Contracts in Dynamic Procurement

    We analyze the problem of a buyer who purchases a long-term project from one of several suppliers. A changing state of the world influences the costs of the suppliers. Complete contracts conditioning on all…

  5. ZEW Discussion Paper // 2019

    Sequential Procurement with Limited Commitment

    We analyze the problem of a buyer who chooses a supplier for a long-term relationship via an auction. The buyer lacks commitment to not renegotiate the terms of the contract in the long run. Thus, suppliers are…

  6. Refereed Journal // 2019

    Equality of Opportunity and Integration in Social Networks

    We propose the notion of k-integration as a measure of equality of opportunity in social networks. A social network is k-integrated if there is a path of length at most k between any two individuals, thus…