Publications of the Research Unit Market Design

  1. ZEW Discussion Paper // 2020

    A Small Volume Reduction that Melts Down the Market: Auctions with Endogenous Rationing

    Auctions with endogenous rationing have been introduced to stimulate competition. Such (procurement) auctions reduce the volume put out to tender when competition is low. This paper finds a strong negative…

  2. ZEW Discussion Paper // 2019

    Commitment in First-Price Auctions

    We study the role of commitment in a first-price auction environment. We devise a simple two-stage model in which bidders first submit an initial offer that the auctioneer can observe and then make a…

  3. ZEW Discussion Paper // 2019

    How the Auction Design Influences Procurement Prices: An Experiment

    The targeted design of auctions has to take behavioral regularities into account. This paper explores whether procurement auction formats can take advantage of bidders' willingness-to-pay-willingness-to-accept…

  4. ZEW Discussion Paper // 2019

    Procurement Design with Loss Averse Bidders

    We show that it is beneficial for a buyer to conduct a multi-stage mechanism if bidders are loss averse. In a first step, we derive a revenue equivalence principle. Fixing the multi-stage structure, the revenue…