Publications of the Research Unit Market Design

  1. Refereed Journal // forthcoming

    Worst-Case Equilibria in First-Price Auctions

    The usual analysis of bidding in first-price auctions assumes that bidders know the distribution of valuations. We analyze first-price auctions in which bidders do not know the precise distribution of…

  2. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 22-064 // 2022

    First Best Implementation With Costly Information Acquisition

    We study mechanism design with flexible but costly information acquisition. There is a principal and four or more agents, sharing a common prior over the set of payoff-relevant states. The principal proposes a…

  3. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 22-062 // 2022

    Motivated Beliefs in Auctions

    In auctions bidders are usually assumed to have rational expectations with regards to their winning probability. However, experimental and empirical evidence suggests that agent's expectations depend on direct…

  4. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 22-060 // 2022

    Congestion Management Games in Electricity Markets

    This paper proposes a game-theoretic model to analyze the strategic behavior of inc-dec gaming in market-based congestion management (redispatch). We extend existing models by considering incomplete information…

  5. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 22-054 // 2022

    Non-standard Choice in Matching Markets

    We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions on participants’ choice behavior for the…