The Combinatorial Multi-Round Ascending Auction (CMRA) is a new auction format which has already been used in several recent European spectrum auctions. The authors characterize equilibria that feature auction-specific forms of truthful bidding, demand expansion, and (riskless) demand reduction for settings in which bidders have either decreasing or non-decreasing marginal values. Overall, their results suggest that the CMRA might be an attractive auction design in the presence of highly complementary goods on sale. They discuss to what extent our theory is consistent with outcomes data in Danish spectrum auctions and how their predictions can be tested using bidding data.


Bernhard Kasberger

Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Germany

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The seminar presentations are scheduled to last 60 minutes: 45 minutes of presentation and 15 minutes for both comments and questions.

We will experiment with various methods for questions: A moderator collects questions during the presentation. Speakers will be encouraged to pause every few slides to allow a gap for questions. The moderator will relay clarification questions or unmute selectively during the talk. Remaining questions will be collected and asked in the discussion period.

Just like with other initiated virtual seminars, these rules are subject to change as we gain experience with how to handle the seminar most efficiently.

The idea for this format was borrowed from the Chamberlain Seminar. Other online seminars can be found at the AEA website.

The Virtual Market Design Seminar is an open online alternative to seminars cancelled due to the COVID-19. Seminars will cover all fields from market design. The seminar presentations are scheduled to last 60 minutes, after 45 minutes of presentation, 15 minutes are for both comments and question.


09.05.2022 | 16:00 - 17:00 (CET)

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