The All-Pay Auction with Non-Monotonic Payoff

Research Seminars

We analyse an endogenous prize all-pay auction under complete information where it is possible that none of the bidders wins and the winning payoff becomes non-monotonic in own bid. We derive the conditions for the existence of pure strategy equilibria and fully characterize the unique mixed strategy equilibrium when pure strategy equilibria do not exist. The highvaluation bidder places two distinct mass points in his equilibrium mixed strategy and the equilibrium support of the low-valuation bidder is not continuous. Under common valuation, in the equilibrium mixed strategy both bidders place mass points at the same point of the support. Possible applications are discussed.


Dr. Subhashish Modak-Chowdhury

Subhashish Modak-Chowdhury // University of East Anglia


Research Associate, Kai Hüschelrath
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