The paper presented in this ZEW Research Seminar examines that in reality, the organizational structure of information — describing how information is transmitted to its recipients — is as important as its content. In this paper, the authors introduce families of (indirect) information structures, namely meeting schemes and delegated hierarchies, that capture the horizontal and vertical dimensions of real-world transmission. They characterize the outcomes that they implement in general (finite) games and show that they are optimal in binary-action environments with strategic complementarities. Their application to classical regime-change games illustrates the variety of optimal meeting schemes and delegated hierarchies as a function of the objective.
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The seminar presentations are scheduled to last 60 minutes: 45 minutes of presentation and 15 minutes for both comments and questions.
We will experiment with various methods for questions: A moderator collects questions during the presentation. Speakers will be encouraged to pause every few slides to allow a gap for questions. The moderator will relay clarification questions or unmute selectively during the talk. Remaining questions will be collected and asked in the discussion period.
Just like with other initiated virtual seminars, these rules are subject to change as we gain experience with how to handle the seminar most efficiently.
The Virtual Market Design Seminar is an open online alternative to seminars cancelled due to the COVID-19. Seminars will cover all fields from market design. The seminar presentations are scheduled to last 60 minutes, after 45 minutes of presentation, 15 minutes are for both comments and question.