The paper presented in this Virtual Market Design Seminar characterizes the set of extreme points of monotonic functions that are either majorized by a given function f or themselves majorize f and show that these extreme points play a crucial role in many economic design problems. The main results show that each extreme point is uniquely characterized by a countable collection of intervals. Outside these intervals the extreme point equals the original function f and inside the function is constant. Further consistency conditions need to be satisfied pinning down the value of an extreme point in each interval where it is constant. Finally, the authors apply these insights to a varied set of economic problems: equivalence and optimality of mechanisms for auctions and (matching) contests, Bayesian persuasion, optimal delegation, and decision making under uncertainty.

The seminar series is jointly organized by ZEW, the University Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas, the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), and the Universities of Bonn and Mannheim. Additional information on the Virtual MD Seminar Series.


Benny Moldovanu

University of Bonn

If you would like to participate and to stay up to date about upcoming presentations, please join our mailing list. You will receive the Zoom link for each talk

The seminar presentations are scheduled to last 60 minutes: 45 minutes of presentation and 15 minutes for both comments and questions.

We will experiment with various methods for questions: A moderator collects questions during the presentation. Speakers will be encouraged to pause every few slides to allow a gap for questions. The moderator will relay clarification questions or unmute selectively during the talk. Remaining questions will be collected and asked in the discussion period.

Just like with other initiated virtual seminars, these rules are subject to change as we gain experience with how to handle the seminar most efficiently.

The idea for this format was borrowed from the Chamberlain Seminar. Other online seminars can be found at the AEA website.

The Virtual Market Design Seminar is an open online alternative to seminars cancelled due to the COVID-19. Seminars will cover all fields from market design. The seminar presentations are scheduled to last 60 minutes, after 45 minutes of presentation, 15 minutes are for both comments and question.


18.05.2020 | 16:00 - 17:00 (CET)

Event Location