The unprecedented access of firms to consumer level data not only facilitates more precisely targeted individual pricing but also alters firms' strategic incentives. The authors of the paper presented in this MaCCI/EPoS Virtual IO Seminar show that exclusive access to a list of consumers can provide incentives for a firm to endogenously assume the price leader's role, and so to strategically manipulate its rival's price. Prices and profits are non-monotonic in the length of the consumer list. For an intermediate size, price leadership entails a semi-collusive outcome, characterized by supra-competitive prices and low consumer surplus. In contrast, for short or long lists of consumers, exclusive data availability intensifies market competition.

Speaker

Carlo Reggiani

The University of Manchester, United Kingdom

The seminars are held on ZOOM. Register with the external registration form to receive reminders, updates, and ZOOM Meeting ID information via e-mail. Seminar presentations are scheduled to last a total of 75 minutes (60 minutes presentations plus 15 minutes Q&A).

Date

23.04.2020 | 15:00 - 16:15 (CET)

Event Location

Online


Contact

Head of Junior Research Group