In this paper I examine the influence which a population of different behavioral types may have on the provision of public goods. In particular, the population or subject pool consists of three behavioral types: myopic selfish agents, enlightened selfish agents and ethically motivated agents. I use a simple agent-based simulation approach that incorporates type interaction based on conditional cooperation within a standard linear public goods model. Among other things, I show that under the given circumstances non-provision of public goods is a negligible issue, even if the share of ethically motivated types in the population is rather small.

Speaker

Michael Pickhardt

Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster

Date

18.03.2010 | 16:00 - 17:30 Uhr

Event Location

ZEW, L 7,1 D-68161 Mannheim

Room

Heinz König Hall

Contact

Senior Researcher