This research incorporates research spillovers and examines behavior of firms in a two-stage, international trade game with process innovation. Governments choose optimal research subsidies in stage one, while firms take account of subsidies in choosing research and production in stage two. Results show that optimal research subsidies differ under spillovers and no spillovers. Strategic responses to foreign research subsidies uniquely occur in cases with spillovers. At certain spillover levels, the optimal R&D policy is a negative subsidy (tax). Findings regarding the effects of trade liberalization support earlier results with perfect appropriability, although responses to trade liberalization are different with spillovers

Speaker

Rajeev K. Goel, Ph.D.

Illinois State University

Date

08.07.2010 | 16:00 - 17:30 Uhr

Event Location

ZEW, L 7,1 D-68161 Mannheim

Room

Heinz König Hall

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