I investigate the decision problem which arises in a game of incomplete information under two different types of uncertainty - uncertainty about other players’ type distributions and about other players’…
Combinatorial auctions, which allow bidders to bid not only on individual items but also on packages of items and to express complementary and substitute relationships between items, have rarely been used for…
The usual analysis of bidding in first-price auctions assumes that bidders know the distribution of valuations. We analyze first-price auctions in which bidders do not know the precise distribution of…
I consider a seller selling a good to bidders with two-dimensional private information: their valuation for a good and their characteristic. While valuations are non-verifiable, characteristics are partially…
We study optimal mechanisms for a utilitarian designer who seeks to assign a finite number of goods to a group of ex ante heterogeneous agents with unit demand. The agents have heterogeneous marginal utilities…
In markets where sellers’ marginal costs of production have a common component, they have informational advantage over buyers regarding those costs. This information asymmetry between sellers and buyers is…