The research area “Design of General Rules for Public Procurement” analyses the optimal design of general rules for public procurement. Public procurement accounts for about 16 per cent of GDP in the European Union. Even small relative efficiency gains can therefore generate savings in the billions. Designing a procurement process often constitutes a complex problem because several different aims must be considered and weighed against each other. Due to their complexity, procurement mechanisms need to be tailored to each specific situation. Nevertheless, it is possible to determine some general rules that play a key role in generating efficiency. These rules are of paramount importance since a detailed examination of each process is almost impossible due to the large quantity and variety of procurement processes. Furthermore, this complexity often requires the implementation of the procurement process to be delegated to an agent (buyer, auctioneer). These agents often have detailed information that is unavailable to the buyer. The aim is to identify decision-making powers that enable agents to use their knowledge, but which at the same time minimise potential abuse.