ZEW Discussion Papers
Cooperation in International Environmental Negotiations due to a Preference for Equity
Lange, Andreas und Carsten Vogt (2001), Cooperation in International Environmental Negotiations due to a Preference for Equity, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 01-14, Mannheim. Download
This paper demonstrates that cooperation in international environmental
negotiations can be explained by preferences for equity. Within a N-country prisoner’s
dilemma in which agents can either cooperate or defect, in addition to the standard
non-cooperative equilibrium, cooperation of a large fraction or even of all countries
can establish a Nash equilibrium. In an emission game, however, where countries can
choose their abatement level continuously, equity preferences cannot improve upon
the standard inecient Nash-equilibrium. Finally, in a two stage game on coalition
formation, the presence of equity-interested countries increases the coalition size and
leads to eciency gains. Here, even a stable agreement with full cooperation can be
reached.
Keywords: international environmental negotiations, cooperation, equity preference, coalition formation
